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LITIGATION COUNSEL CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
Introduction
The comfortable lines drawn by intellectual property litigators to
ensure confidentiality of work undertaken for alleged infringers in
patent cases are disintegrating. The papers and communications of
patent litigation defense counsel, once thought to be safely
undiscoverable, may now be exposed to the eyes of careful patentees.
Courts and litigators are currently grappling with the scope of the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection
triggered by invoking the advice of counsel defense to willful patent
infringement. A series of recent decisions at the district court level
regarding the scope of the waiver could dramatically alter common
practices of attorneys on both sides of the counsel table in patent
litigation. 1
Accused patent infringers stand to lose the most from the storm
forecasted by the recent district court decisions. Perhaps the most
expansive discovery order in this new series of cases reasoned and
ordered, "[i]t is difficult to imagine the circumstances where the
standard for discovering the vast majority of work product will not be
met in an advice of counsel case .... All documents containing work
product relevant to the infringement issue must be produced."'2 That
decision did not distinguish between opinion and litigation counsel.3
Another less expansive order, more typical of the current trend,
provided:
To the extent that trial counsel has documents or responsive
information as to what was said to or by an alleged infringer on the
subject matter of the opinion letters, the documents and information
are discoverable. Further, in cases where an alleged violation may be
continuing, trial counsel must also disclose all mental impressions,
conclusions, or legal theories communicated to the client which
contradict or cast doubt on the opinion letter or the bases of the
letter.4
1. See, e.g., RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., C96-20094 SW PVT (N.D. Cal. filed
Aug. 5, 1996)(unpublished opinion), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 1997 WL 376919
(Fed. Cir. June 17, 1997); Clintec Nutrition Co. v. Baxa Corp., No. 94-C-7050, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4001, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 1996); Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey
Mushrooms, 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1767 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
2. Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1770.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 134-142.
4. RSA Data Sec., No. C96-20094 SW PVT (citations omitted). Though the decision
concerning a motion to compel discovery was limited by Magistrate Judge Patricia V.
Trumbull "to the facts of this case, and the particular circumstances underlying the present
1997]
Such orders may force litigation counsel to disclose documents
relating to litigation strategy because those documents discuss the
merits and drawbacks of patent opinions previously drafted by other
attorneys. The trend could therefore have a devastating effect on an
attorney's ability to provide advice. The risk of inadvertently
disclosing litigation strategy to an opponent may prevent defense
counsel in patent litigation from properly developing and discussing
strategy with the client.
A thoughtful treatment of the issue, like the one undertaken by
the court in the unpublished RSA Data Security opinion, demonstrates
the catch-22 currently faced by the courts. The attorney-client
privilege and work product protections are only waived if the alleged
infringer asserts the "advice of counsel" defense to a claim of willful
infringement. Where the alleged infringer invokes this defense, it
seems only fair that the opposing party have a full opportunity to
review, and impeach, the documents and other evidence supporting
the position. Further, Federal Circuit precedent allows a jury to draw
inferences against alleged infringers on the issue of willfulness if the
alleged wrongdoer did not obtain an opinion from legal counsel.5 The
"choice" of an alleged infringer not to waive the privilege or work
product protection is therefore frequently an illusion.6 Unless
sufficiently limited, the expanding scope of the waiver may force
litigation counsel to disclose every document communicated to the
client to their opponents. A broad waiver of discovery protection
could allow a patentee's counsel to depose clients regarding otherwise
privileged conversations with their attorneys, or perhaps examine the
trial attorneys, if the attorney somehow "cast doubt" on an existing
patent opinion.
The best possible solution to this dilemma is to draw a new line to
enforce the waiver of discovery protection. That line is best drawn at
the time of filing an infringement claim - documents drafted prior to
the time of filing would be discoverable while those drafted after filing
would 'remain protected.
Modern patent practitioners recognize that an attorney issuing a
patent opinion is required to provide documents, and potentially other
testimony, to a plaintiff relating to the opinion if the accused infringer
motion," the statement quoted above is a good example of the current state of the law. Id.
5. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
6. See John Dragseth, Note, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1995).
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invokes the advice of counsel. Practitioners, however,, frequently
assume a separate law firm representing an alleged infringer in
litigation would be immune from compelled discovery absent an
express written waiver of work product protection. For example, one
commentator advised his readers,
The client can also take steps to limit the scope of waiver. One such
practice involves using one law firm to obtain an infringement
opinion letter and a second law firm for litigation. As a result, if the
client is forced to produce an opinion letter from counsel,
communications made with the second law firm may be shielded
from discovery because the communications did not provide the
opinion.7
Another set of commentators reasoned,
A practice which may help to limit the scope of future discovery is to
use one law firm to provide an opinion letter (so that the firm is the
only source of counsel on this matter) while designating a second law
firm to handle any future litigation which may occur on the matter.
In effect the first law firm is shielded from all other information.
Although this idea may be difficult to implement, the effort may be
justified at a later date when the client raises a state-of-mind defense
based upon the opinion letter. Because of the precaution, discovery
may be limited to only the first law firm.8
Recent developments in the law demonstrate that these
recommendations rest on an unstable premise. If the current trend of
expanding the scope of the waiver continues, following such a
recommendation could be extremely costly. Litigation counsel may be
forced to disgorge documents regardless of whether a different law
firm drafted the patent opinion on which the alleged infringer chose to
rely. 9 This possible symptom of an enlarged scope of the waiver is not
7. James Y. Go, Comment, Patent Attorneys and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 611, 643 (1995).
8. Kenton R. Mullins, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Immunity in Patent Litigation, 350 PLIIPAT. 393, 413 (1992)(for presentation by Edwin H.
Taylor).
9. One could imagine that the resulting shift of incentives could hasten the decline of
the market for "patent boutiques." Drafting patent opinions is a lucrative business for such
ventures, as clients attempt to follow the guidance described above. See supra notes 7-8
and accompanying text. This shift may encourage trends already evident in the shape of
patent practice, both by tightening the market for the services of "patent boutiques" and
by removing the disincentive for larger, full-service law firms to avoid building a practice
involving the issuance of patent opinions. See generally Henry J. Reske, Riding the Brain
Train: Many Intellectual Property Lawyers are Making the Move from Boutiques to Full-
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as serious from a policy perspective as for its effect on attorney-client
relations.
This Note first outlines the procedural context in which the
"scope of the waiver" issue arises. Part I explains the role of opinion
and litigation counsel in a typical patent infringement action. Part I
will pay special attention to Federal Circuit case law regarding use of
the "advice of counsel" defense to willful infringement, and the
resulting importance of patent opinions. Part II examines the scope of
the waiver issue, noting the common reliance of counsel in patent
matters on separate opinion counsel to ostensibly limit the scope of
the waiver. Part 1II analyzes the recent series of federal district court
opinions which cast doubt on patent litigation counsel's ability to
limit opponent access to documents once thought to be privileged.
Part IV proposes a solution to the dilemma, suggesting ways in which
the underlying policy justifications for the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrines may be protected, while allowing
plaintiff's counsel access to documents which should be available
during discovery in patent cases. This Note concludes by suggesting
that a line should be drawn at the time of filing a patent infringement
action, after which litigation counsel's documents should not be
discoverable.
I
Setting the Stage: Opinion Counsel,
Litigation Counsel, and the Advice of Counsel Defense
A general understanding of the procedural setting in a "typical"
patent infringement case is essential to unpacking the discovery
protection waiver issues discussed here. The basics of the situation are
deceptively straightforward: The alleged infringer in a patent matter
will typically do the utmost to prove that the patent held by the
plaintiff is invalid, and that even if the patent is valid, the alleged
infringer did not actually infringe the patent. The advice of an
attorney in the form of a legal opinion concerning validity and
Service Megafirms, A.B.A. J., Feb., 1997, at 30 (noting the continued movement of "patent
boutique" attorneys to larger law firms); Amy Stevens, The Business of Law: Lawyers &
Clients, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1995, at B3 (discussing competing motives for organizing law
firms as specialized "boutiques" or more generalized providers of a broad range of legal
services).
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infringement (the "patent opinion") is an important tool for possible
infringers to gauge their rights and liabilities. Most important for the
purposes of this Note, the patent opinion communicated to the alleged
infringer is the cornerstone of the advice of counsel defense against
claims of willful patent infringement. Stated simply, an alleged
infringer may escape treble damages by demonstrating that it relied
on the advice of its lawyer before making, using, or selling the
infringing invention.
The following section provides a brief overview of patent
practice. It is intended to highlight the strategic decisions surrounding
invocation of the advice of counsel defense, as well as the potential
problems associated with determining the scope of the resulting
waiver of discovery protection.
A. Acquiring the Patent
The vast majority of patents granted by the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) are not litigated.10 The process by which
someone acquires a patent is, however, essential to the future success
or failure of the patentee's case. It is axiomatic that the patent must be
valid, and the defendant's actions must actually infringe the patent in
order for the patentee to win.11 The defendant in a patent matter will,
if possible, attack the validity of the plaintiff's patent in order to
destroy the case before the court even reaches the question of
infringement. 12
An invention may follow a myriad of paths from its conception in
the mind of an inventor to the final award of a patent. The validity of
10. "In 1985, the [PTO] granted 57,302 patents and accepted 125,931 applications; by
last year those numbers had climbed to 114,241 and 236,679 respectively, according to the
PTO." Mark Walsh, Patently Ridiculous?, RECORDER: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Oct.
1996, at 24 (magazine). An unscientific survey indicates the disparity of the small number
of patent infringement actions filed with the vast number of patents granted. A search of
Westlaw using the words "patent infringement" with a 1996 date limitation reveals 151
reported district court opinions and 306 total cases.
11. The Patent Act provides, "[w]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
12. The question of patent validity is one of three factors considered in the typical
legal opinion, issued by the counsel of a possible infringer. See infra Part I.B. An alleged
infringer's reliance on such a legal opinion, as proof of lack of willfulness in any




the resulting patent depends in large part on the ability of an
inventor's attorney to demonstrate that the path taken by the
invention complied with the strict demands of the Patent Act.13
Future litigation frequently focuses on the factual questions regarding
the inventor's activities prior to seeking a patent. These questions
include whether the patent was made obvious 14 or was not novel
based on existing documentation of similar inventions (called "prior
art"), 15 and whether the inventor, often through the inventor's patent
prosecutor, used good faith in seeking to obtain a patent from the
PTO.1 6 The patent prosecutor must engage in a dialogue with the
PTO, during which the PTO highlights the shortcomings of the patent
application, while the patent prosecutor seeks to persuade the PTO
that the invention is entitled to a patent.
17
13. See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). The "obviousness" or "section 103" inquiry requires the
trier of fact to determine whether the "subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made-to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains." Id. See Reed Marcy, Note, Patent Law's Nonobviousness Requirement, 19
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 199 (1996) (examining court approaches to determining
nonobviousness). See generally Grahm v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (affirming the
validity of 35 U.S.C. § 103).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)("invention... known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication" unpatentable),
§ 102(b)("invention... patented or described in a printed publication ... or in public use
or on sale ... more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States" unpatentable), § 102(c)(inventor who "abandoned the invention" not
entitled to patent), § 102(d)(invention patented abroad over one year before filing patent
application in the United States unpatentable), § 102(e)("invention described in a patent
granted on an application for patent by another ... before the invention thereof by the
applicant" unpatentable), § 102(f)(inventor who "did not himself invent the subject matter
sought to be patented" not entitled to patent), § 102(g)("before the applicant's
invention.., the invention was made.., by another who had not abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed it" precludes grant of patent)(1994). The "novelty" or "section 102"
requirements for patentability frequently require an intensive factual inquiry. These
requirements are designed to preserve the United States' "first to invent" patent policy.
See Marcy, supra note 14.
16. See generally Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Jeffrey G. Sheldon & Otto Lee, Impact of Federal Circuit on Patent Litigation, 2
PAT. LITIG. 879, 905-09 (Nov.-Dec. 1993). The text dramatically simplifies the questions at
issue in a patent matter in order to set the procedural scene for this Note.
17. "During the patenting process, which typically lasts 18 months or longer, an
examiner may send a patent back two or three times with questions or comments for the
applicant to address before finally approving or rejecting it." Walsh, supra note 10, at 26-
27. The dialogue with the PTO while the patent is prosecuted results in an accumulation of
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A competent patent prosecutor, able to both understand the
technological "art" surrounding the invention as well as the sometimes
byzantine rules and regulations surrounding proper patent drafting
and prosecution, is therefore essential to ensuring that a patent is
upheld by a court as valid.18 The manner in which a patent is drafted,
and supported with specifications, is also critical to creating the
broadest possible rights. 19
Drafting pitfalls may also result in a subsequent finding of patent
invalidity by a court.20 Drafting errors may also destroy a patent
documentation known as the "file history" or "wrapper" (because of the package in which
it is contained) of a patent. See Dragseth, supra note 6, at 176 & n.51. A patent's file
wrapper is a matter of public record, and is often critical evidence in the development of a
patent opinion and, if necessary, in subsequent litigation. See, e.g., York Prods., Inc. v.
Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
18. See generally Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (6th ed. Rev. 1, Sept. 1995),
(visited Dec. 10, 1996) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/mpep.html>.
19. See, 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112 (1994). For example, a patent may, in some
circumstances, grant the holder a monopoly over "equivalents" of the patented invention.
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); see also Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996). For a discussion of the so-called "doctrine of equivalents,"
its significance in patent litigation, and the Supreme Court's pending review of the doctrine
in Hilton Davis, see William Alsup & Carolyn Wiggin, Hilton Davis and Jury Trials, 18
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 721, 723-28 (1996); Bob Ciaviello, Equivalents Evidence Is
Expanded, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C14. The scope of the "claims and limitations" of a
patent are critical to determinations of both standard infringement as well as infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. Further, "a patent can be drafted to best exploit an
invention's commercial potential," though proper drafting does not always require the skill
of a patent attorney. Walsh, supra note 10, at 28.
20. For example, recent developments in the law regarding software patentability
require strict adherence to proper drafting standards. The patent prosecutor must have
some knowledge of these standards in order to draft a patent that will actually protect the
software. See, e.g., Nancy J. Link & Karen A. Buchanan, Patent Protection for Computer-
Related Inventions: The Past, the Present, and the Future, 18 HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J.
659, 661-62 (1996). The key issue surrounding the grant of software patents is whether the
patent as drafted reads exclusively on a mathematical algorithm, which is non-statutory
subject matter since an algorithm is the equivalent of a force of nature. See Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.
Cir. 1994)(en banc); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The PrO recently issued
guidelines which a patent attorney may follow to determine the fine line between drafting
statutory and non-statutory claims for software patents. Examination Guidelines for
Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996); see also Link & Buchanan, supra.
Interpretation of the Patent Act as applied to computer software has become
increasingly important to the computer industry in recent years. See, e.g., Richard H.
Zaitlen & Wendy Yang, Software Patents: Vendors Rush to Protect Innovations,
MICROTIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at 122. Part of the reason for the computer industry's reliance
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holder's ability to successfully claim infringement even if the patent
itself was validly issued.21 The alleged patent infringer will, in the vast
majority of patent cases, conduct extensive discovery on each of these
issues.
B. Infringement, Litigation, and Limitations on Discovery
The Patent Act grants a "statutory monopoly" allowing the
patentee to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, or
selling the patented invention.22 Upon discovering that someone may
be infringing the patentee's patent, the patentee may exercise a
number of options. Among these, the patentee may send a notice of
infringement to the alleged infringer, requesting that the infringer
cease their actionable conduct. The patentee may suggest (or more
likely demand) that the infringer pay the patentee a royalty in
exchange for permission to make, use, or sell the invention. The
patentee may also simply file a patent infringement action against the
alleged infringer, providing no notice whatsoever.
1. Notice of Infringement and the Alleged Infringer's Duty of Care
The patentee will generally provide the possible infringer with
actual notice that their own patent already exists, and that the possible
infringer is engaged in some form of wrongful conduct. 23 Providing
on patent law is the development of Federal Circuit case law allowing patent protection of
software and clarifying the murky waters of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the field. See
generally Link & Buchanan, supra. Recent Supreme Court and Second Circuit
(traditionally the leading jurisdiction on matters of copyright law) decisions limiting the
applicability of copyright protection to computer software have also made the software
patent the preferred method of protecting software. See Zaitlen & Yang, supra at 122
(commenting on Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), and
Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996)).
21. The district court will construe patent claims as a matter of law. Westview
Instruments, Inc. v. Markman, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); see generally Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-
Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 18-21 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(discussing reach of impermissible
infringement under section 271). The Patent Act does not give the patentee the right to
actually make, use, or sell the invention themselves, but only to exclude others from such
activity. Active inducement of infringement and contributory infringement are also
actionable under the Act. See 35 U.S.C.§ 271(b), (c).
23. See, e.g., Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1983); but see Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems
Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(sustaining finding that alleged
infringer "was aware of each of the patents only 'as of' the date on which suit was filed on
each."); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir.
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this notice may serve a number of strategic purposes. First, when the
patentee does not provide prior notice that their patent exists, the
patentee can only claim additional damages for willful infringement
under the Patent Act in extremely limited circumstances. 24 Second,
providing actual notice to a possible infringer triggers a series of legal
duties with which the alleged infringer must comply. Actual notice is
also the first step toward forcing an alleged infringer to invoke the
advice of counsel defense and the first step toward the discovery crisis
which is the focus of this Note.
Receiving notice that a patent exists upon which a firm or
inventor may be infringing, the alleged wrongdoer "has the duty to
'exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing."' 2  An
alleged infringer's failure to live up to its duty of care can, in certain
circumstances, exponentially increase damages owed to the patentee.
The Federal Circuit explains,
Under section 284 of The Patent Act, 26 damages may be enhanced
up to three times the compensatory award. An award of enhanced
damages for infringement, as well as the extent of the enhancement,
is committed to the discretion of the trial court. While no statutory
standard dictates the circumstances under which the district court
may exercise its discretion, the Federal Circuit has approved such
awards where the infringer acted in wanton disregard oj the patentee's
patent rights, that is, where the infringement is willful.2 '
Additionally, the Patent Act provides that "[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
1985)(patentee commences infringement suit only twenty-two days after acquiring patent
and without providing actual notice to the alleged infringer).
24. The Federal Circuit explains, "[a] party cannot be found to have 'willfully'
infringed a patent of which the party had no knowledge." Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems
Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 511 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Though the patentee is not required
to provide the alleged infringer with actual notice of its infringing conduct, the patentee
must demonstrate that the alleged infringer knew the patent in question existed. Id. at 510.
25. Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(citing Underwater
Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
26. The Patent Act provides:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by
a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (emphasis added). For a general discussion of patent damages, see Harold
E. Wurst & Anne Wang, The Law of Patent Damages, 2 PAT. LITIG. 7 (Nov.-Dec. 1993).
27. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992)(emphasis added).
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prevailing party."28 A finding of willful infringement frequently
satisfies the requirement that the case be "exceptional," allowing the
award of attorney fees. 29 Though the court has the power to enhance
damages for willful infringement, the court is not obliged to do so. The
Federal Circuit painstakingly points out that a proper decision
regarding whether or not the alleged infringer lived up to their duty of
care, or engaged in willful infringement, requires consideration of the
"totality of circumstances" surrounding the defendant's conduct. 30
The key to the "willfulness" inquiry is the alleged infringer's state of
mind,31 and the advice of counsel defense is often used to demonstrate
that the accused reasonably believed no wrong had been committed.
The Federal Circuit provides some guidance concerning the
willfulness inquiry in Bott v. Four Star.32 The court explains that the
totality of the circumstances include:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of
another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's
patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a
good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed, and
(3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation.33
For example, an alleged infringer's good faith defense of their
conduct during litigation may stand as evidence of their lack of
willfulness. 34 The factors set forth in Bott, while not exhaustive,35 are
28. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
29. Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(citing Bot, 807
F.2d at 1574); see also Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1567
(Fed. Cir. 1988)("Although an award of attorney fees, because discretionary, does not
automatically follow from the willfulness of an infringement .... our cases uniformly
indicate that the willfulness of the infringement... may be a sufficient basis in a particular
case for finding the case 'exceptional ... ')(citations omitted).
30. See, e.g., Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826-27; Bott, 807 F.2d at 1572; Rolls-Royce, Ltd.
v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at
1579; King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
31. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Micron
Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 363 (D. Mass. 1995), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 1997 WL 438188 (Fed. Cir. July 15, 1997); Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Micron
Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616,620 (D. Del. 1993).
32. 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. See Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 509 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
35. Additional factors in a court's willfulness inquiry may include: the "[d]efendant's
size and financial condition... [the c]loseness of the case... [the diuration of defendant's
misconduct... [any rlemedial action by the defendant... [the d]efendant's motivation for
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frequently used by trial courts in their efforts to determine willfulness.
The Federal Circuit has consistently stressed that "[w]hether an act is
willful' is by definition a question of the actor's intent."36 The court is
to examine the "totality of the circumstances" in order to determine
whether the alleged infringer acted with the intent to infringe the
patentee's invention.
2. The Patent Opinion: Satisfying the Alleged Infringer's Duty of Care
Despite the Federal Circuit's demand that district courts examine
the "totality of the circumstances" in a willful infringement inquiry,
the presence or absence of a legal opinion, obtained from the alleged
infringer's patent attorney, is often the linchpin of a district court's
conclusion on the issue. Numerous patent decisions, citing the Federal
Circuit's seminal opinion in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 37 explain that fulfilling the alleged infringer's duty of
"due care" following actual notice of possible infringement
"includes... the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice
before engaging in activity that may result in infringement. 3 8
Therefore, the possible infringer must rely on the advice of counsel.
That advice must, almost without exception,39 take the form of a
written legal opinion evaluating the validity of the patent in question
and the legality of the alleged infringer's conduct. The competence of
the attorney issuing the patent opinion ("opinion counsel") will
frequently be an issue. The patent opinion must therefore "constitute
authoritative opinions 'upon which a good faith reliance on invalidity
[and non-infringement] may be founded.' 40 Failure to obtain a patent
opinion where the patentee provided the alleged infringer with actual
harm... and [w]hether [the] defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct." Read Corp.
v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992)(citations omitted). See also Donald L.
Cox, Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, 2 PAT. LITIG. 301, 303-07 (Nov.-Dec.
1993)(citing cases).
36. Gustafson, 897 F.2d at 510 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Read Corp., 970 F.2d at
828.
37. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
38. See, e.g., id. at 1390.; Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
39. See, e.g., Bott v. Four-Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(holding oral
opinion consisting "merely of conclusory statements" inadequate to support advice of
counsel defense).
40. Bott, 807 F.2d at 1572 (quoting Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines,
Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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notice, while "not dispositive," 41 frequently provides a court with an
easy way out: Without an opinion, the accused infringer must
overcome a nearly insurmountable burden of persuasion, regardless of
the other factors in the mix.
Excellent justifications exist for requiring an accused infringer to
rely on patent opinions and the advice of counsel. The Federal Circuit
explains:
A party who has obtained advice of competent counsel, or otherwise
acquired a basis for a bona fide belief that a patent is invalid, can be
said to serve the patent system in challenging that patent in a law
suit conducted fairly, honestly, and in good faith. Such a party
should not have increased damages or attorney fees imposed solely
because a court subsequently holds that belief unfounded,
particularly when the issues may be fairly described as "close."
42
Further, "[a]n alleged infringer who intentionally blinds himself
to the facts and law, continues to infringe, and employs the judicial
process with no solidly based expectation of success, can hardly be
surprised when his infringement is found to have been willful." 43
Thus, requiring that an accused infringer use the advice of counsel
defense may present serious difficulties in practice. The form and
substance of the legal opinion rendered by the alleged infringer's
counsel are important factual matters in determining whether the
defendant's 44 reliance on the advice of counsel was reasonable.45
Patentees combating the advice of counsel defense will argue,
sometimes successfully, that the attorney's opinion was biased due to
41. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
42. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
43. Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Kloster
Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1580 n.11).
44. Note that "defendant" has used here refers to the alleged infringer. The alleged
infringer will, of course, not be the defendant in cases where it has filed for declaratory
relief.
45. As one court explained, "[i]n considering the reasonableness of the accused
infringer's reliance on an opinion of counsel, the opinion letter should be reviewed for its
'overall tone, its discussion of case law, its analysis of the particular facts and its reference
to inequitable conduct."' Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 5, 1997)(citing Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d 935, 943-44
(Fed. Cir. 1993)(omitting citations)). A thorough discussion of the requirements of a
proper patent opinion is beyond the scope of this Note. For such a discussion, see generally
Cox, supra note 35, at 301. See also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828-29 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656-57
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Central Soya Co. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
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the attorney's "stake in the outcome,"46 or to the failure to analyze
important documents related to the patent.47 Information surrounding
acquisition of the patent opinion, and the basis for the advice of
counsel upon which the alleged infringer seeks to rely, is therefore
critical to the resolution of a patent dispute.48 In light of the
importance of the advice of counsel defense to the outcome of a
patent case, "once the decision is made in favor of using the defense,
the plaintiff is 'entitled to full disclosure in order to prepare its
case.'49
An alleged infringer's failure to obtain a proper legal opinion in
such a case may be the end of its hopes of a successful defense against
a finding of willful infringement. Even though the Federal Circuit has
not created a per se rule of willfulness where an alleged infringer has
not sought the advice of counsel,5 ° the district court may draw an
extremely strong inference against the alleged infringer. The Federal
Circuit explained in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co.,
"[w]here the infringer fails to introduce an exculpatory opinion of
counsel at trial, a court must be free to infer that either no opinion was
obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was contrary to the
infringer's desire to initiate or continue its use of the patentee's
invention." 51 The patent opinion is a communication between
attorney and client; the documents on which the attorney relies in
46. See Cox, supra note 35, at 310-11 (quoting Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
47. Such as the patent itself, or the patent prosecution history. See, e.g., Cox, supra
note 35, at 308 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
48. For a concise analysis of the rules concerning competence of opinion counsel, see
Steven D. Glazer & Daniel A. DeVito, Concise Survey of Current Law on Willful Patent
Infringement, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2,3-4 (Oct. 1994).
49. FMT Corp. v. Nissei ASB Co., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1073 (N.D. Ga.
1992)(quoting Keyes Fibre Co. v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 763 F. Supp. 374, 376 (N.D. Ill.
1991)).
50. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992)(citing Kloster
Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1034 (1987); Rolls-Royce, 800 F.2d at 1109 (holding district court decision not to infer
willfulness from alleged infringer's decision not to seek patent opinion not clearly
erroneous).
51. 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(citing Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1579-
80) For an extensive discussion of Kloster Speedsteel and Fromson, see John Dragseth,
Note, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Opinions of Counsel in Patent
Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 167, 183-87 (1995).
19971
drawing the opinion is, of course, work product. Without disclosure of
these items, an alleged infringer is faced with the treble damages and
attorney's fees triggered by willful infringement.
This inference has a dramatic impact on patent litigation in light
of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine.52 As one critic explained, "[t]he inference presents an
accused patent infringer with a harsh dilemma: present the opinion
and waive the attorney-client privilege or assert the privilege and risk
having the court infer that the opinion was unfavorable." 53
Paradoxically, "[t]he choice is between a complete sacrifice of the
privilege or a complete sacrifice of the defense."'4
The Federal Circuit recognized this dilemma, and suggested at
least one solution to prevent harm to the alleged infringer from the
resulting catch-22. In Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp. the court
urged, "[tjrial courts thus should give serious consideration to a
separate trial on willfulness whenever the particular attorney-client
communications, once inspected by the court in camera, reveal that
the defendant is indeed confronted with this dilemma." 55 Though trial
courts do order bifurcation of the willfulness issue,56 bifurcation does
not solve the problems regarding scope of the waiver during pretrial
discovery. Evidence which relates to willfulness is frequently
congruent with evidence concerning patent validity and infringement
generally. The decision of the trial court in Home Elevators, Inc. v.
Millar Elevator Service Co.57 is a case in point. In that case, the court
held:
[A]ny opinion of the defendants' counsel related to the validity of
the patent or possible infringement, which would otherwise be
covered by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-
product doctrine, will be relevant, probative and admissible at trial
on the issue of willfulness. Further, evidence of a willful violation
which would support enhanced damages is a finding of fact
52. See Part II.A supra for a basic discussion of discovery protections.
53. Dragseth, supra note 51, at 168.
54. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832-33 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
55. 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Fromson v. Western Litho Plate &
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(cited with approval in Quantum Corp.).
56. See, e.g., Key Technology, Inc. v. Simco/Ramic Corp., 137 F.R.D. 322, 325 (D. Or.
1991).
57. 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1055, 1055 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
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inextricably bound to the facts underlying the alleged infringement.58
At least one court has expressed the opinion that bifurcation for
trial, or a delay on discovery on the issue of willful infringement,
should not be used to circumvent the dilemma caused by Federal
Circuit advice of counsel case law. The court in Johns Hopkins
University v. Cellpro explained, "[t]he opinions in Underwater
Devices, Crucible, and Quantum have shifted the focus of most
bifurcation motions in patent cases from a technique to reduce the
inefficiencies in litigation by trying issues separately to a way to
minimize potential prejudice in a single trial by staying discovery." 59
The Cellpro court concluded it was:
inclined to find that it is generally much more efficient to work
towards one trial and one appeal. A single trial followed by an
appeal is the best procedure for the court to follow in working to
achieve our goal under the Civil Justice Reform Act of resolvilig
litigation within eighteen months after the filing of the complaint."
The court found:
[i]t is understandable that those involved in patent litigation would
want to minimize the risk of harm from this problem and would look
to the Rules of Civil Procedure for possible solutions.... [But] [i]t is
not in the interests of justice to make these adjustments to our
procedures for litigating cases to solve this problem.'
Cellpro teaches two lessons. First, though the suggested solution of
the Federal Circuit, it is not certain that an alleged infringer will be able
to convince a district court to bifurcate for trial, or delay discovery on,
the issue of willful infringement. Second, the Federal Circuit's reliance
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) to resolve the waiver dilemma
may itself be misplaced. Bifurcation, while a useful solution where
evidence relating to willfulness can be held from a jury until it makes
its findings regarding infringement, does not prevent patentees from
accessing privileged or protected materials related to patent opinions
of counsel. Even if a trial court decides to limit discovery concerning
willfulness to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work product
protections, the dilemma remains in many cases where bifurcation is
impractical or impossible.
58. Id. (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. James River Corp., 131 F.R.D. 607, 609 (N.D.
Ga. 1989).). But see Key Technology, 137 F.R.D. at 325 (holding discovery of legal advice
relied upon by the alleged infringer was premature "because the court has ordered
bifurcation of the issues of liability and damages .....
59. 160 F.R.D. 30, 34-35 (D. Del. 1995).
60. Id. at 35 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(B)).
61. Cellpro, 160 F.R.D. at 36.
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3. Attorney-Client Privilege
Though a thorough and comprehensive discussion of the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines is beyond the
scope of this Note,62 a number of basic principles underlying both
forms of protection is helpful to understanding the scope of the waiver
dilemma.
The opinion of Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.63 includes a frequently cited description of the policy
rationales underlying the privilege. 64 In that case, the court quoted the
Comment to Rule 210 of the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence
extensively:
In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws
as complex and detailed as imposed upon us, expert legal advice is
essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and
honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequisite. To
induce clients to make such communications, the privilege to
prevent their later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to
be a necessity. The social good derived from the proper performance
of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to
outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the
evidence in specific cases. But the jrivilege should be strictly
construed in accordance with its object. 5
One court recently explained, "[t]he privilege exists to 'promote
the adversary system by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney's trial
preparation from the discovery attempts of an opponent."' 66 Further,
"[i]t creates a 'zone of privacy within which an attorney can think, plan,
weigh facts and evidence, candidly evaluate a client's case and prepare
legal theories."' 67
62. For a thorough summary of the law regarding the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine, see Alvin K. Hellerstein, A Comprehensive Survey of the Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, 498 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL
PRACTICE 579 (Mar. 21, 1994).
63. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). This opinion was one of a series of decisions
issued by Judge Wyzanski in the mammoth antitrust disputes involving United Shoe.
64. Judge Wyzanski's substantive holding, that patent opinions are never protected by
the attorney-client privilege, was subsequently overruled. See Donald W. Banner,
Something There is That Doesn't Love a Wall, 258 PLI/PAT. 707, 712 (1988).
65. Id. at 358 (quoting Comment, Rule 210, A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence)(citation
omitted).
66. Hager v. Bluefield Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 176 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D.D.C. 1997)(quoting
In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
67. Id. (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Deptartment of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864
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These policy justifications retain their full force in the context of
patent litigation. Expert legal advice is exceedingly important in the
context of patent law. In fact, cases such as Underwater Devices v.
Morrison-Knudsen demand reliance on candid legal advice to
determine proper conduct in the context of patent infringement. 68 As
explained in the following section, however, the privilege must
sometimes give way. This is due to the potential for abuse of the
privilege to prevent disclosure of documents relating the advice given
to an alleged infringer, where the alleged infringer is using that advice
as the crux of its defense against claims of willful infringement. The
important question is just how much the privilege must give way in the
face of this challenging set of facts.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience .... 69
Further, "[t]he rule with respect to~rivileges applies at all stages
of all actions, cases, and proceedings." The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow "[p]arties [to] obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action .... The information sought need not be admissible at
the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 71
The alleged infringer, upon deciding to invoke the privilege, must
"make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a
manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or
protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection." 72 In a patent infringement case, the required
disclosure may take the form of a "privilege log" filed with the court.
(D.C. Cir. 1980)).
68. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
69. FED. R. EVID. 501.
70. FED. R. EVID; 1101.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
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Courts also may order an in camera inspection of documents included
on the privilege log to resolve discovery disputes.
4. Work Product Protection
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) codifies the so-called
work product doctrine first expressed in Hickman v. Taylor.73 Rule
26(b)(3) provides that material "prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial" can only be discoverable "upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means." 74 So-called "opinion work product," consisting of
"attorneys' mental processes," and including an attorney's mental
impressions or opinions, can only be discovered if the party requesting
the information makes an extremely strong showing of hardship and
necessity. 75 The Supreme Court has placed a premium on work
product protection.76 However, the Court has recognized significant
limits to the protection. As it explained in Hickman, "[w]here relevant
and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where
production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case,
discovery may properly be had. ... ,77
Special problems are presented by the situations where a party
attempts to rely on advice of counsel as a defense. Documents
typically protected as work product suddenly become highly probative
of whether an alleged infringer properly relied on the advice of
counsel. At the same time, however, protected documents may have
no bearing on the state of mind of the alleged infringer. If the accused
infringer had no knowledge of potentially damaging documents
hidden in an attorney's files regarding that attorney's patent opinion,
waiver of the work product protection makes little sense. As the
73. 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
75. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981). See also Hager v.
Bluefield Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 170 F.R.D. 70, 76 (D.D.C. 1997)("There are thus two levels
of protection, one for 'fact' work product which is subject to discovery upon a showing of need
and hardship and a more absolute protection for 'opinion' work product which is subject to
discovery only upon a showing of extraordinary justification.") (citing In re Sealed Case, 676
F.2d 793, 810-811 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512-13)).
76. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40
(1975)).
77. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
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following section illustrates, courts are struggling with defining the
scope of the waiver of the work product doctrine, attempting to
preserve the policy underpinnings of the doctrine while addressing the
substantial need of a patentee to have access to information regarding
the advice given by counsel to an alleged infringer.
II
Scope of the Waiver
A. Waiver Generally
1. Lack of Appellate Court Guidance
The Federal Circuit's leading decision regarding the advice of
counsel defense, Underwater Devices v. Morrison Knudsen,78 never
mentions the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. As a
practical matter, however, that decision transformed the advice of
counsel defense into the linchpin of any discussion of willful
infringement. 79 By definition, asserting the advice of counsel as a
defense requires that at least some documents otherwise protected
from discovery be disclosed.
Appellate courts have given little advice on exactly what sorts of
documents and information fall within the scope of the waiver.
Limited waivers of the attorney-client privilege, where the advice of
counsel is placed in issue by a party, have long been recognized in the
United States. 80 Yet Federal Circuit decisions concerning the advice
of counsel defense in a patent law context, though recognizing that a
waiver of these protections occurs upon invocation of the advice of
counsel defense and noting the problems caused by the waiver,81
78. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
79. See supra Part I.B.2.
80. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1888)(requiring limited waiver
of attorney-client privilege where defendant asserted fraudulent conveyance of property
was the result of an attorney's poor advice).
81. See Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643-44 (Fed. Cir.
1991)(suggesting "separate trial on willfulness" where alleged infringer must either choose
to waive the privilege or risk the negative inference); Fromson v. Western Litho Plate &
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(suggesting bifurcation of the
willfulness issue "may be useful in meeting the attorney-client privilege problem."). As the
court in Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc. found, "I have not found any Federal Circuit
authority directly addressing" the scope of the waiver problem. 1997 WL 97085, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 1997). "The Federal Circuit has, however, provided substantial
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rarely explain the rationale behind it, and provide little, if any,
guidance regarding its scope. 82
This lack of guidance exists, in part, due to the difficulty
defendants face in raising the issue on appeal.83 In those cases where
the waiver issue has been directly put to the Federal Circuit, the facts
of the case have not forced the court to make a clear statement of the
law. For example, in American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., the court
explained that patent validity opinions may sometimes be protected
by the attorney-client privilege. 8 However, the court determined that
since the patent opinion "did not reveal confidential
communications,.., there was, accordingly, no need to consider
whether any waiver might have encompassed the particular testimony
and documents sought by [the plaintiff] and claimed by [the alleged
infringer to be] privileged. ' '85 Federal district courts have done their
utmost to fill the policy void left by the Federal Circuit, though the
scope of the waiver remains far from clear.
2. The Waiver Rule: Fairness and the Selective Use Problem
Both the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines
protect extremely important interests. The rule that a limited waiver
of these protections must accompany invocation of the advice of
guidance concerning the general principles governing the advice of counsel defense." Id.
82. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit's failure to flesh out its position on
privilege and work product protections concerning the work of patent prosecutors
generally, see Daniel A. DeVito & Michael P. Dierks, Exploring Anew the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine In Patent Litigation: The Pendulum Swings Again,
This Time in Favor of Protection, 22 AIPLA 103,130-32 (Spring 1994).
83. See, e.g., In re Ethicon, Inc. & Johnson & Johnson Hosp. Servs., Inc., 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14268 (Fed. Cir. March 11, 1993)(denying, in the advice of counsel context,
writ of mandamus to vacate order to compel documents claimed to be protected by
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines because issue is within trial court's
discretion); Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991)(holding
orders to compel privileged or protected documents not immediately appealable under the
Cohen doctrine or under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). The Federal Circuit's position regarding
writs of mandamus in the advice of counsel defense is not shared by all courts of appeals.
See, eg., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir.
1994)(granting writ of mandamus to review discovery order demanding disclosure of
protected documents).
84. 828 F.2d 734, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1987)(citations omitted).
85. Id. Interestingly, the court in American Standard was divided on the privilege
issue. See American Standard, 828 F.2d at 747-751 (Newman, J., dissenting)(arguing
majority decision "negates the privilege of patent validity opinions based on prior art"
despite the majority's attempt to limit its holding to the facts of the case presented).
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counsel defense in patent matters does encroach on these interests.
Importantly, the "underlying rationale" of the waiver "is one of
'fairness."' 86 First, a party cannot have a court consider patent
opinions and other evidence of legal advice to an alleged infringer
without allowing their opponents an opportunity to impeach and
otherwise refute the evidence.87 As one court explained, "Although
the attorney-client privilege is an important element of our legal
system, parties should not be able to manipulate the privilege so as to
release only favorable information and withhold anything else."88 The
privilege and work product protections would be too easily
manipulated by accused patent infringers 89 without imposition of a
limited subject matter waiver. 90 In practical terms,
A party claiming good faith reliance upon legal advice could
produce three opinions of counsel approving conduct at issue in a
86. Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
87. The defendant in FMT Corp. v. Nissei ASB Co. creatively attempted to have the
court examine patent opinions and other evidence pertaining to the advice of counsel in
camera without allowing their opponents access to the evidence. 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1073 (N.D. Ga. 1992). The chagrined court explained, "[allthough Nissei never directly
indicates what result it expects from the court's in camera inspection, the implication is
that Nissei expects the court to examine the documents and then rule that there was no
willful infringement, all without FMT having an opportunity to respond to defendant's
evidence." Id. at 1074. The court refused the defendant's request, holding "the court will
not consider the issue of willfulness without allowing FMT to examine and respond to the
opinions and documents relied upon by Nissei." Id. at 1075.
88. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 155 F.R.D. at 171.
89. See, e.g., St. Gobain / Norton Indus. Ceramics Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 884
F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Mass. 1995)(explaining it is "fundamentally unfair to allow a party to
disclose opinions which support its position, and simultaneously conceal those which are
adverse.")(citations omitted); FMT Corp., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1075 ("It would be
grossly unfair to allow the defendant to produce certain selected documents which it feels
support its defense while withholding from the plaintiff possibly damaging communications
which tend to disprove the defendant's theory."); Kelsey-Hayes Co., 155 F.R.D. at 171;
Board of Trustees of Stanford Univ. v. Coulter Corp., 118 F.R.D. 532, 533 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D. I11. 1987);
Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976)("[a] party
may not insist on the protection of the attorney-client privilege for damaging
communications while disclosing other selected communications because they are self-
serving.").
90. As one court attempted to explain, "[a] 'subject matter' waiver [is] a waiver of all
communications on the same subject matter." Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159
F.R.D. 361, 363 (D. Mass. 1995) (citations omitted). Such a circular definition is not
particularly helpful to an analysis of subject matter waiver. Other courts have had more
success expressing the policy behind the subject matter waiver. See infra text
accompanying note 91.
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lawsuit and withhold a dozen more expressing grave reservations
over its legality. Preservation of privilege in such a case is simply not
worth the damage done to truth.91
Such a rule is reasonable in light of public policy and the
underlying rationales of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrines. This selective use problem is not limited to patent
matters, and various courts of appeals have applied a limited subject-
matter waiver to avoid unfair results.92
The precise scope of the waiver, however, is a topic on which trial
courts in patent matters have been less than clear. Courts warn that
"waivers have been narrowly construed in patent cases." 93 At the
same time, other judges have issued extremely broad discovery orders,
holding that "defendants have waived the attorney-client privilege
with respect to all documents pertaining to the infringement" at issue,
and demanding "[a]ll documents containing work product relevant to
the infringement issue must be produced. 94 Further, documents
which were "relied upon or considered by counsel at the time and in
conjunction with rendering" the patent opinion may or may not be
discoverable. 95 One court grappling with the issue explained,
[T]he privilege is waived as to all information provided by the client
to the attorney, regarding the subject matter of the opinion. In this
regard, the scope of the waiver is 'broad,' to the extent that it is
91. Abbott Labs., 676 F. Supp. at 832.
92. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 858 (3d Cir.
1994)(insurance coverage dispute); Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 976
F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1992)(insurance coverage dispute); Weil v. Investment/Indicators,
Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 23-24 (9th Cir. 1981)(securities fraud
dispute).
93. Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. 94-CV-4603, in 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14061, at *6 (Sept. 22, 1995)(citing Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155
F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991)); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156
(D. Del. 1977)).
94. Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1767,
1770, 1771 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The Mushroom Associates decision demanded an extremely
broad waiver of both attorney-client privilege and work product protection. The language
and rationale of the opinion could apply in virtually any situation in which the advice of
counsel defense is invoked. For a more thorough discussion of the implications of
Mushroom Associates, see infra Part II.C.
95. FMT Corp., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1075; see also Haney v. Timesavers, Inc.,
No. 93-151-FR, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15222, at *9 (quoting FMT Corp., supra). But see,
e.g., Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 621 (D. Del.
1993)("Neither the basis for the opinions nor their actual competence is a matter of
consequence to the determination of the action.").
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:949
LITIGATION COUNSEL CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
necessary to shed complete light upon the alleged infringer's state of
mind. By the same token, the scope of the waiver appears narrow, as
it pertains to the attorney's state of mind.96
B. Defining the Boundaries of the Waiver
An analysis of recent case law indicates that courts have
attempted to draw lines to define the scope of the waiver in three
ways. First, a number of courts have attempted to limit the scope of
required disclosure to documents that "contradict or cast doubt" on
the legal opinions previously received by an alleged infringer. Second,
in an attempt to protect attorney "opinion work product," some courts
have required that only documents communicated to the client be
discoverable. Finally, virtually all courts agree that a line may be
drawn requiring disclosure where a broad, explicit, written waiver is
made by a client. This Note discusses each of these limitations in turn.
1. "Fairness" Applied: Limiting the Waiver to "Opinions Which Contradict
or Cast Doubt" on Prior Advice
As explained above, fairness is one of the key reasons for
demanding at least some waiver of privilege and work product
protections in advice of counsel situations.97 A number of courts have
drawn on this rationale to limit the scope of the waiver concerning the
subject matter contained in potentially protected documents. Micron
Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp.98 is the leading case adopting such a
limitation. Judge Collings' decision in that case is a thoughtful attempt
to reconcile the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines
with the evidentiary demands of the advice of counsel defense.
In that case, the alleged infringer (Micron) attempted to "freeze"
discovery "as of the time of the opinion letter" given to them by
outside opinion counsel.99 The court first decided that the scope of the
waiver "must of necessity be somewhat broad and is... a waiver of all
communications on the same subject matter."1°° Judge Collings
96. Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., No. 1:96CV 46, 1997 WL 97085, at *3 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 5, 1997).
97. See supra Part II.A.2.
98. 159 F.R.D. 361 (D. Mass. 1995).
99. Id. at 362.
100. Id. at 363. Note the contrast with Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. 94-
CV-4603, in 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14061, at *6 (Sept. 22, 1995), which suggested the scope
of the waiver must be construed more narrowly.
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reasoned that if Micron received information that the existing patent
was valid, regardless of whether the information was obtained after
Micron received a formal patent opinion, that information would
affect Micron's state of mind.10 1 The court therefore held that the
scope of the subject matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege
encompassed all documents held or received by Micron bearing on
whether Micron's "product infringes Pall's patent. 10 2
The work product doctrine presented a more difficult dilemma
for the court in Micron. Judge Collings again relied on his reasoning
concerning the special relevance of information received from legal
counsel when such information might be considered "potentially
damaging information."'10 3 The court, however, was required to
"protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3). 10 4 Given the Supreme Court's demand that a party
demonstrate a strong need to obtain opinion work product, and a
similarly strong demonstration that the information contained in the
opinion work product was unavailable by other means, the court
reasoned that "a subject matter waiver should not automatically
extend to communications between trial counsel and the client." 10 5
On the other hand, the demands of fairness in preventing an alleged
101. Micron, 159 F.R.D. at 363. The court in Thorn EMI v. Micron Technology, Inc.
elaborated on the state of mind requirement. 837 F. Supp. 616, 621 (D. Del. 1993). That
court held:
Thorn [the patentee] should be entitled to discover facts relating to when Micron
[the alleged infringer] sought the advice, what Micron knew about the law firm's
independence, skill and competence to provide the opinions, what Micron knew
about the nature and extent of analysis performed by the firm, and what Micron
knew and had concluded about the credibility, value and reasonableness of the
opinions.
Id. However, the court would not allow the plaintiff to seek information regarding the
objective competence of opinion counsel or the documents relied upon by the opinion
counsel in formulating the patent opinion. Id.
102. Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 363-64. Importantly, Judge Collings held that
Pall could discover documents "generated... or received by [Micron] up to the date the
instant case was filed...." Id. (emphasis supplied). This temporal limitation, linking
discovery of privileged documents to the filing date of the case, supports the conclusions of
this Note as discussed in Part IV infra.
103. Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 365.
104. Id. at 364 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)).
105. Id. at 364.
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infringer from hiding "bad" documents behind a veil of privilege and
work product protections, implicate equally important notions of
fairness. As Judge Collings explained, "[p]reservation of privilege in
such a case is simply not worth the damage done to truth. 106
Judge Collings therefore "decline[d] to apply the waiver to
documents containing the opinion work product of present trial
counsel which is solely consistent with the opinion letter and does not
in any way cast doubt on the validity of the opinions expressed or the
bases for those opinions."' 1 7 His discovery order required the alleged
infringer to disclose opinion work product communicated to it where
the information "contradict[ed] the opinion letter or recite[d] facts or
contain[ed] any other information which casts doubt on the opinion
letter and/or the bases of the opinions contained therein."'1 8 The
subject matter contained in documents communicated to Micron
would, based on their relevance to Micron's state of mind, determine
whether or not the documents were subject to discovery.
The approach taken by the court in Micron attempts to strike a
fair balance between protecting privilege and work and ensuring that
the alleged infringer cannot take advantage of its ability to invoke the
advice of counsel as a shield against a finding of willful infringement.
For this reason, the Micron Separations decision has been emulated by
several other courts. In Clintec Nutrition Co. v. Baxa Corp., the court
invoked Micron Separations as one reasonable limitation on the scope
of the waiver.10 9 In that case, the accused infringer (Baxa) was
required "to identify on a privilege log all work product documents
which it believes it [could] withhold under" the rule adopted by
Micron Separations.110 The court would resolve disputes between the
parties by reviewing documents on the privilege log, if challenged, in
camera.111 The court in RSA Data Security, Inc. v. Cylink Corp. also
invoked the fairness limitation in an unpublished decision.112
106. Id. at 365. (citations omitted).
107. Id. (emphasis omitted).
108. Id. at 366 (emphasis omitted).
109. Clintec Nutrition Co. v. Baxa Corp., No. 94-C-7050, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4001,
at *6 (March 28, 1996).
110. Id.
111. Id. at *6-7.
112. RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., C96-20094, slip op. at 6 (Aug. 5, 1996).
Significantly, the court did not adopt the temporal limitation used by Judge Collings in
Micron Separations to limit discovery to the period prior to the filing of the patent case
with the court. Id. at 5 n.2.
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Practically speaking, however, the rule in Micron is difficult to
apply effectively. Documents which directly contradict a written
patent opinion are relatively easy to identify. If one patent opinion
declares a patent valid, and another opinion, issued later, declares the
same patent invalid, an accused infringer may not restrict access to the
second opinion. However, there is a substantial question as to
whether, for example, the subsequent verbal statements of litigation
counsel that a particular patent validity defense might fail would "cast
doubt" on a prior patent opinion. Must the accused infringer disclose
litigation counsel's warnings regarding how a particular trial strategy
governing their validity defense might not succeed? A litigation
counsel's warning could easily be viewed as "casting doubt" on a
previously issued patent opinion. At the very least, a patentee may
have grounds to dispute lack of disclosure in this context, requesting
that the court conduct an in camera review of such evidence. Such a
review, while not necessarily dispositive of the willfulness inquiry,
could give the patentee an unfair advantage before a judge assessing
whether treble damages and attorney's fees are available. 113 A judge
might not look kindly on an accused infringer whose counsel
suggested that the judge might believe a novelty defense but would
fail to understand the subtleties of a non-obviousness defense. 114
2. Strong Protection of Opinion Work Product: The "Communications"
Theory of Waiver
Courts use the underpinnings of the work product doctrine to
provide the basis for limiting the scope of the waiver to documents
communicated by counsel to the alleged infringer. 115 The court in
Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Associated Mills, Inc. was among the first
113. Recall the court in FMT Corp. v. Nissei ASB Co., see supra note 87, which rejected
a patentee's attempt to have the judge review an alleged infringer's documents in camera
without providing the accused infringer with an opportunity to respond to issues those
documents might raise with the judge. 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1073 (N.D. Ga. 1992). The
fairness limitation as imposed in Micron Separations may allow just this result.
114. Both novelty and nonobviousness address the validity of the patent at issue. See
supra notes 13-15.
115. The Supreme Court's strong language regarding the importance of the work
product doctrine provides at least one reason for the greater attention paid to protection of
work product as compared to protection of the attorney-client privilege. See generally
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399-401 (1981); United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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to apply this limitation in the context of patent infringement. 116 As
with the Micron Separations approach to the work product, the court
in Teledyne began by noting that the state of mind of the accused
infringer provided the key to resolving the willfulness inquiry.117 If the
alleged infringer did not know of a document hidden in its attorney's
files which might contradict or cast doubt on the patent opinion given
to them, the alleged infringer's state of mind would not be affected.
118
As the court explained, "[a]ssociated [the alleged infringer] cannot
rely on documents and communications to which it had no access."
119
Without communication of the information in the protected
documents to the client, the documents would be irrelevant to the
question of the client's state of mind. Irrelevance, when coupled with
the powerful mandate of the work product doctrine, provided an
excellent reason to limit discovery of materials that were not disclosed
to the client by the attorney.
The court in Thorn EMI of North America v. Micron Technology,
Inc. also applied this communications limitation.120 The court
explained that it did not believe that a party's assertion of good faith
reliance on advice of counsel necessarily puts attorney work product
at issue. The facts of consequence to the deciding of a claim of willful
infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind. Counsel's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are "not probative
of that state of mind unless they have been communicated to that
client."121
The court in Thorn EMI also admonished the plaintiff for
attempting to reach the files of litigation counsel. Judge McKelvie
pointedly and appropriately noted that a "discovery foray" into
documents belonging to the alleged infringer's litigation counsel to
find documents concerning "the law firm's plans for associate
development [did] not appear to be designed to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive determination" of the case. The judge referred the
plaintiffs to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for





120. 837 F. Supp. 616,622 (D. Del. 1993).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
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guidance. 122 A significant number of courts agree with the logic of
both Teledyne Instruments and Thorn EMI.123
Limiting the scope of the waiver to information actually conveyed
to a client is sound both in theory and in practice. The advice of
counsel defense is an extremely large piece of the willful infringement
puzzle, but it is only one piece.12 4 The key inquiry is whether the
accused infringer possessed the state of mind necessary to willfully
infringe the patent at issue. Though the accuser may desperately want
to obtain documentation forming the basis for a patent opinion
communicated to a client in order to impeach the attorney or get a
glimpse of the strategy behind voiding infringement, such evidence
doesn't answer the essential question regarding what the alleged
infringer knew. From a practical standpoint, Judge McKelvie's
criticism of the patentee in Teledyne Instruments is appropriate.
Allowing a patentee to foray into the litigation files of opposing
counsel would disrupt the alleged infringer's attorneys, and would
result in disclosure of documents which the patentee has no need to
acquire. 125
3. Explicit Waivers
An explicit waiver of the attorney-client privilege and of work
product protection precludes an alleged infringer from later invoking
either theory. As one court explains:
A sophisticated, well-counseled party who intentionally discloses an
important part of an otherwise privileged communication acts in a
manner that is thoroughly inconsistent with preserving the
confidentiality of that communication. Stated somewhat differently,
a sophisticated party who intentionally discloses the most significant
part of an otherwise privileged communication, cannot establish, as
122. Id. at 623. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
Federal Rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., No. 1:96CV 46, 1997 WL 97085, at *3, *4
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 1997); Clintec Nutrition Co. v. Baxa Corp., No. 94-C-7050, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4001, at *6 (N.D. Ill. March 28, 1996); RSA Data Security, Inc. v. Cylink
Corp., No. C96-20094, slip op. at 5-6 (Aug. 5,1996). The courts in Micron Separations and
Timesavers similarly limited discovery to documents in the alleged infringer's possession,
though these courts did not cite Teledyne, 159 F.R.D. at 366; Haney v. Timesavers, Inc.,
No. 93-151-FR, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15222, at *8, *9 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 1995).
124. Recall Bott v. Four Star: Willful infringement must be determined from the
totality of relevant facts. 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See supra Part I.B.2.
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:949
LITIGATION COUNSEL CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE
the law would require, that the party reasonably believed that it
would be able to preserve the confidentiality of the other parts of
that communication. 12
For example, in McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries,
Inc., the alleged infringers sent a letter to their opponent stating that it
"will accordingly waive the attorney-client privilege as to the subject
matter of the advice given" to it.127 Though the letter waiving the
privilege attempted to limit the waiver to a period only after a specific
date, the district court found that "[a] party cannot preserve a
privilege in the face of an explicit, voluntary waiver such as the one in
this case." 128 The McCormick-Morgan case presents a rare situation,
in which counsel clearly made an extremely broad waiver of their
protection under the work product doctrine, and the client made a
broad waiver of its protections under the attorney-client privilege. 129
The decision in McCormick-Morgan is also important due to the
waiver of the work product protection of trial counsel found by the
court. However, McCormick-Morgan does not provide that the work
product of litigation counsel is discoverable under all circumstances
where the advice of counsel defense is invoked. Again, the decision is
limited by the facts surrounding the explicit waiver of the protection
in that case. Further, the "trial counsel" whose work product was
subject to the court's discovery order was in fact the trial counsel in
prior litigation: Litigation counsel in the case before the court issuing
the discovery order was not subject to the order.130
III
Advice to Counsel:
Use of Separate Opinion and Litigation Counsel
May Not Protect Litigation Counsel Statements
or Papers in Light of Recent Case Law
Counsel in patent matters frequently draw another line in patent
126. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. v. General Scanning, Inc., WL 587000, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 18, 1997).
127. 765 F. Supp. 611,613 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
128. See id. at 614.
129. McCormick-Morgan does not stand for the proposition that the scope of the
waiver can never be limited temporally, rather it means that an explicit waiver regarding
specific subject matter cannot later be temporally limited based on the particular facts of
the case.
130. Id. at 613-14.
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cases based on the type of advice rendered by an attorney to their
client. Attorneys are often distinguished between those who actually
render a patent opinion ("opinion counsel"), and the litigators who
fight against claims of patent infringement in court ("litigation
counsel"). 131 It is common practice among patent attorneys, both
opinion and litigation counsel alike, to assume that waiver of
discovery protections is necessary for opinion counsel but not for
litigation counsel. 132
These practices stem from the notion that the attorney-client
privilege and work product protections arise between a client and each
counsel individually. However, the law regarding subject matter
waiver demands that all documents relating to the subject of the issues
covered by the advice of counsel defense, regardless of which attorney
was responsible for drafting the document, be disclosed. 133 Cases
typically do not address the issue of whether separate and
independent litigation counsel, upon entering the case long after a
patent opinion is issued by opinion counsel, also must disclose
documents relating to the issues of patent validity, enforceability, or
infringement. This silence may be due to a patentee's failure to draft a
motion to compel discovery which covers information exclusively in
the possession of trial counsel, or to a court's failure to recognize that
such a broad discovery order could be entered given the present state
of the law.
A handful of recent district court decisions have expanded the
131. See, e.g., Go, Comment, supra note 7, at 643 (advising that clients may limit the
scope of the waiver by using different opinion and litigation counsel).
132. See id.; Mullins, supra note 8, at 413; Roger L. Cook, Boundaries of Discovery in
Patent Litigation, 299 PLI/PAT. 77, 103 (1990)("As a general rule, waiver of privilege in
attorney-client documents relating to a particular subject waives the privilegee as to all
communications between the same attorney and the same client on the same
subject.")(emphasis added). Cf. Steven D. Glazer & Daniel A. DeVito, Concise Survey of
Current Law on Willful Patent Infringement, 6 No. 10 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 7 (Oct.
1994)(noting "[s]ome commentators have suggested ... using separate litigation counsel
and counsel for preparing opinions" to limit the scope of the waiver, but noting "this tactic
may prove ineffective in view of the 'subject matter' test endorsed by many courts.").
133. See, e.g., Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616,
620-21 (D. Del. 1993); FMT Corp. v. Nissei ASB Co., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1073, 1075
(N.D. Ga. 1992); Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 171 (W.D.
Mich. 1991); Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832-33 (N.D.
Ill. 1987)("[T]he choice is between a complete sacrifice of the privilege or a complete
sacrifice of the defense."); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
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scope of the waiver dramatically, and perhaps eliminated whatever
measure of protection was once achieved by segregating opinion and
litigation counsel. The leading case in this vein is Mushroom
Associates v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc.134 In that case, Magistrate
Judge Hamilton of the Northern District of California relied on the
fairness rationale 135 to decide that upon invoking the advice of
counsel defense, "defendants have waived the attorney-client privilege
with respect to all documents pertaining to the infringement" of the
patent at issue.136 The court made no distinction based on who
provided the advice to the accused infringer, invoking Handgards v.
Johnson & Johnson to reject the alleged infringer's argument that
discovery should be limited to the single patent opinion upon which it
intended to rely.137 In itself, the court's ruling on the privilege issue
was not earth-shattering.
Turning to the work product doctrine, however, the court
determined that the "substantial need" requirement of Rule 26(b)(3)
would virtually always be satisfied in patent cases where the alleged
infringer invokes the advice of counsel defense. 138 The court
explained, "it is difficult to iinagine the circumstances where the
standard for discovering the vast majority of work product will not be
met in an advice of counsel case."139 The court then held, "[a]ll
documents containing work product relevant to the infringement issue
must be produced."140 Though the discovery order issued in
Mushroom Associates did not explicitly include the work product of
litigation counsel, the extremely broad language used by the court
would certainly cover such information. Further, the decision opens
the door to expanding the scope of the waiver to litigation files
concerning patent validity and infringement. None of the limitations
of the scope of the waiver discussed above were invoked in the
Mushroom Associates decision. As one court critical of that decision
found, Mushroom Associates "is based upon faulty analysis, under
which the attorney's state of mind, and not that of the client, becomes
134. 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1767 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
135. See supra Part II.A.2.
136. Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1770 (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1770-71.




paramount.' ' 141 The court's broad language, finding virtually any work
product touching on issues of patent validity and infringement
relevant to the willfulness question, effectively eviscerated the two
forms of protection,142  while Teledyne Systems and Micron
Separations attempted to develop and apply a more subtle test to
preserve the underlying policies at issue.
One of the first courts to squarely address the question of access
to litigation counsel files following Mushroom Associates explicitly
rejected Judge Hamilton's broad interpretation of the scope of the
waiver. 143 In Thorn EMI of North America v. Micron Technology,
Inc., the court reasoned:
The facts of consequence to the determination of a claim of willful
infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind. Counsel's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not probative
of that state of mind unless they have been communicated to that
client. Therefore, the Court declines to follow the decisions in these
cases [citing Mushroom Associates].144
The Mushroom Associates court had opened the door to broad
discovery orders, touching on both litigation and opinion counsel. The
Thorn EMI court also accepted the premise that the theory of subject
matter waiver and the principles of fairness, underlying the waiver
where the accused infringer asserts the advice of counsel defense,
demanded some access to documents falling under the work product
protection. Thorn EMI, however, placed an important limitation on
the scope of the waiver by requiring that material be communicated to
the client.145
The court in Micron Separations, examining the Mushroom
Associates decision, also recognized that Judge Hamilton's language
was extremely broad in scope, and could include the work product of
trial counsel.146 In Micron Separations Judge Collings both limited
141. Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., No. 96-CV46, 1997 WL 97085, at *4 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 5, 1997)(citing Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 92-877, slip op. at 5 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 15, 1995)).
142. See Steelcase, 1997 WL 97085, at *4 (criticizing Mushroom Associates for "not
attempt[ing] to divine from Federal Circuit authority any controlling principle grounded in
substantive patent law.").
143. Thorn EMI of N. Am. v. Micron Technology, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 621-22 (D.
Del. 1993).
144. Id. at 622.
145. Id. at 623. See also supra Part II.B.2.
146. Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 364-65 (D. Mass.
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discovery of litigation files only to work product actually
communicated to the client and to documents which contradicted or
cast doubt on the opinions previously obtained by the client. 147
The courts in Clintec Nutrition Co. v. Baxa Corp. and RSA Data
Security, Inc. v. Cylink Corp. also avoided the broad implications of
the Mushroom Associates decision, and adopted the Micron
Separations approach. 148 These courts likely discovered the difficulty
presented by actual application of the fairness limitation suggested by
Micron Separations. The court in Clintec Nutrition attempted to solve
the problem by using in camera review to resolve disputes regarding
application of the "casts doubt" rule.149 That court unfortunately
failed to address the potential for abuse of the in camera review
process. 1
5 0
It also appears that the courts in Clintec Nutrition and RSA Data
Security both inadvertently expanded the scope of the waiver beyond
the previously recognized limitations in Micron Separations and Thorn
EML Specifically, neither court deemed to adopt the temporal
limitation of Micron Separations.151 The court in Thorn EMI also did
1995)(citing Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1771).
147. Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 365-66. See also supra Part II.B.
148. Clintec Nutrition, No. 94-C-7050, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4001 (March 28, 1996);
RSA Data Sec., No. 96-C-20094 (Aug. 5, 1996). Both decisions ignored the temporal
limitation set by the court in Micron Separations, however, and did not limit discovery to
documents communicated to the client prior to the date the case was filed.
149. Clintec Nutrition, No. 94-C-7050, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4001, at *6-7.
150. See FMT Corp. v. Nissei ASB Co., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1073 (N.D. Ga. 1992);
see also supra notes 87-113 and accompanying text.
151. 159 F.R.D. 361, 366 (D. Mass. 1995); RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., No.
C96-20094, slip op. at 5 n.2 (Aug. 5, 1995). The alleged infringer in RSA Data Security drew
the court's attention to the temporal limitation in Micron Seperations. The RSA court
found:
RSA cites Micron for the proposition that subject matter waiver of attorney client
privilege does not extend to after the date the patent infringement action is filed.
Micron does not support RSA's position. Rather, the court in Micron ordered
production of trial counsel's documents disclosed to the plaintiff which reflected
mental impressions, conclusions, and theories which contradict the opinion letter
or recite facts which cast doubt on the opinion letter and/or the bases of the
opinions.
Id. (citing Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 365).
The court in RSA Data Security overlooked the language of the discovery order issued
by the court in Micron Separations, which explicitly limited production to documents
"generated by present trial counsel disclosed to [the alleged infringer] prior to the date on
which the instant action was filed." Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 366 (emphasis
added). The court in Micron Separations did not elaborate on this limitation, but the
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not apply the temporal limitation in Micron Separations. However,
Thorn EMI is distinguishable from Micron Separations in ways
inapplicable to Clintec Nutrition and RSA Data Security. Specifically,
the accused infringer in Thorn EMI obtained all patent opinions from
the same counsel who litigated the matter in court.152 Though the
court placed no temporal limit on the discoverability of work product
relating to validity and infringement at the time of the filing of the
case, the court seemed to tailor its order to fit only evidence relevant
to obtaining the opinions.153 Advice rendered during the course oflitigation and after the patent opinions were given does not appear to
have fallen within the court's order.
The courts in Clintec Nutrition and RSA Data Security laudably
ignored the broad language of Mushroom Associates, and did not cite
that case. The court in Thorn EMI, as previously discussed, explicitly
rejects the holding in Mushroom Associates.154 However, at least one
court has applied the broad language of Mushroom Associates topermit a discovery foray into attorney work product. The court inHaney v. Timesavers, Inc. held that the alleged infringer had "waived
the attorney/client privilege as to all communications between [the
alleged infringer] and any of its counsel concerning the issues ofinfringement and" validity of the patents at issue.155 The courtdemanded production of documents never seen by the accused
infringer, and written, at the request of patent opinion counsel, by alaw firm not hired by the accused infringer.156 Though the court in
Timesavers did not explicitly address discovery of litigation counsel
limitation was clearly present in the discovery order.
152. Thorn EMI, 837 F. Supp. at 619.
153. Id. at 621.
154. Id. at 621-22. Additionally, the court in Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. v. GeneralScanning, Inc., 1997 WL 587000, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997), criticized MushroomAssociates as not "squarely addressing the 'irrelevance' rationale;" that is, failing to explain
why documents drafted drafted by counsel but not communicated to the client should be
discoverable.
155. No. 93-151-FR, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15222, at *7-8 (D. Or. 1995)(emphasis in
original). Cf Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Stanhope Prods. Co., 930 F. Supp. 45, 48(W.D.N.Y. 1996)(citing Mushroom Associates and quoting the broad language regarding
scope of waiver in context of inequitable conduct). Additionally, at least one court has
cited Mushroom Associates regarding its scope of the waiver analysis outside the context ofthe advice of counsel defense. See Hager v. Bluefield Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 96-93RMU, 1997 WL 24830, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 1997). That case involved waiver of the workproduct doctrine in the context of expert testimony in a breach of contract and
racketeering case. Id. at *1.
156. Id. at *7-9.
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files, the language quoted above leaves virtually no doubt that such
files would be discoverable.
The court in Variable-Parameter Fixture Development Co. v.
Morpheus Lights, Inc. also relied on the broad scope of the waiver set
by Mushroom Associates to allow a patentee to discover a
memorandum drafted by an associate at the firm previously used by
the alleged infringer. 157 That court reasoned "access to all documents
before the opinion provider is essential to cross-examination." 158 The
court further distinguished Thorn EMI based on the fact that the
opinions in Variable-Parameter were given verbally, rather than in
writing.159 Given that set of facts, a broad interpretation of the scope of
the waiver may have been warranted. Without a written patent opinion,
supporting documentation forming the basis of the opinion of counsel
would be required by a patentee to conduct an effective cross
examination. Importantly, the court in Variable-Parameter did not apply
Mushroom Associates in the context of documents produced by
litigation counsel. Also, Variable-Parameter is easily limited to facts
where written patent opinions are unavailable.
Such broad decisions as Mushroom Associates and Timesavers, as
well as decisions which attempt to somewhat narrow the scope of the
waiver like Clintec Nutrition and RSA Data Security, demonstrate the
significant risks faced by accused patent infringers and their trial
attorneys. Though critical of both Mushroom Associates and
Timesavers, the court in Electro Scientific agreed that the waiver of
work product protection, even where documents drafted by counsel
had not reached the client, is appropriate in some circumstances. 160
The court in Electro Scientific explained that the alleged infringer and
its counsel typically claim that a limited amount of correspondence, in
that case one letter, "reflect[] accurately the substance of all of the
communications from counsel that reached GSI's [the alleged
infringer's] mind (before the suit was filed) on whether GSI would be
violating ESI's [the patentee's] patents if GSI continued to attempt to
manufacture, use or market products or systems covered by ESI's
patents."'161
The court reasoned that, in such cases, work product not
157. 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1158 (S.D.N.Y.Mar. 18, 1994).
158. Id. (citing Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1770).
159. Id




disclosed to the client would remain probative of whether additional
documents or verbal communications passed between the attorney
and client consisting of advice of counsel regarding possible
infringement' 62
Few observers have commented on the vulnerability of trial
counsel files, and the issue may become a significant trap in future
patent cases.163 It is easy to envision a situation where an attorney
evaluates a portion of a case concerning patent validity while advising
the client, and tells the client that it might not win. In fact, to do
otherwise might violate the canons of professional responsibility
which prohibit an attorney from assuring a client of a victorious
outcome in pending litigation.164 Given these facts, the court reasoned
that a failure to allow some limited waiver of work product protection
as to documents not directly communicated to the client would result
in potential injustice. As the court explained:
I will assume that the kind of work product most likely to be in issue
in settings like this is 'opinion' work product--the kind that enjoys
the highest level of protection. Working from this assumption, we
frame the issue as follows: are the values and interests that would be
promoted or protected by ordering limited access to opinion work
product in this situation appreciably weightier than the harm that
would be done to the values that support protection for opinion
work product?165
The court reasoned, "the kind of work product evidence that is in
issue here could, in some cases, contribute a great deal to the
reliability of the truthfinding process with respect to" whether
additional, negative advice was given to the client regarding
infringement. 166
The court limited the waiver of work product not communicated
to the client in two ways. First, the court limited disclosure of these
162. Id. at *7.
163. The problem has been recognized by some commentators. See Mark Alan Flagel
& Rachel Terner, An Accused Patent Infringer's Dilemma: Waive the Attorney-Client
Privilege, or Risk a Finding of Willful Infringement, 11 COMPUTER LAw 20 (June 1994).
164. For example, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 7.1 provides:
"A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it: ... (b) is likely to create an
unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve." Does this mean that advice
which would comply with the rules of professional responsibility by providing a candid
evaluation of various litigation strategies would also of necessity "cast doubt" on a prior
patent opinion?
165. Id. at *8.
166. Id.
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documents "only to plaintiff's outside counsel. '167 In this way, the
opposing party would not be privy to work product that evaluated the
alleged infringer's product in a manner that revealed trade secrets or
other sensitive information. Most importantly, the court in Electro
Scientific placed a temporal limitation on the scope of the waiver,
discussed below. 168
For example, an attorney could tell an accused infringer that,
though their argument regarding a patent's obviousness under section
103 of the Patent Act is weak, the client has a strong argument under
section 102 regarding the novelty of the invention. Does such a candid
evaluation contradict or "cast doubt" on a prior patent opinion, issued
by opinion counsel, which told the client that it had both a strong
claim under sections 102 and 103? Though the lines drawn in Micron
Separations and Thorn EMI seem reasonable, these cases can be used
to abuse the discovery process in an attempt to gain access to an
accused infringer's litigation strategy. Using the above example, a
patentee could discover that it need not be concerned with the alleged
infringer's case concerning patent obviousness. The patentee could
then focus its efforts on defeating the section 102 arguments the
patentee now knows will be the crux of the alleged infringer's validity
argument. Regardless of the probative value of the information to the
court in determining willful infringement, the information could be an
invaluable insight into the litigation strategies of the litigation
attorneys attempting to defend the accused infringer.
IV
Moving Towards a Reasonable Solution
Given the potential for discovery abuse by applying the recent
trial court decisions described in Part II, a solution is required that will
balance the fundamental principles underlying the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrines, while at the same time
protecting patentees from unfair use of these doctrines to hide
information critical to the question of willful infringement.
A. A Line Between Opinion and Litigation Counsel
At least one commentary which recognized this Achilles heel of
litigation defense counsel in patent cases suggests the best way to
167. Id.
168. See infra notes 173-184 and accompanying text.
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protect "the interests of all parties" would be "to draw a clear and
unequivocal line of demarcation between litigation counsel, on the
one hand, and separate counsel from whom opinions on validity and
infringement may be solicited for the purpose of exploring a defense
against willful infringement. '169 Such a policy:
[W]ould allow for an equitable balancing of attorney-client privilege
policies on the one hand, and the rights of a patentee to fully explore
the basis of a defense against willful infringement on the other....
In our view, if an accused infringer does not solicit from or seek to
rely on a formal opinion from litigation counsel or counsel hired in
anticipation of litigation against a claim of willful infringement, the
accused infringer must be able to protect its relationship with
litigation counsel and its ability to secure confidential advice from
litigation counsel concerning litigation strategy, and1_yet still be
permitted to rely on an opinion of separate counsel....
Unfortunately, this solution faces several challenges. First, the
line between opinion and litigation counsel does not address the fact
that, at least in theory, the client waives the privilege and work
product protections as to the subject matter at issue, not as to the
individual rendering the opinion. There is no reason why a client
cannot obtain a clean opinion from an opinion counsel, while relying
on litigation counsel to give them a candid (and potentially negative)
evaluation of patent validity and infringement.
Were litigation counsel entirely protected under the proposed
limitation, the door could be opened to potentially dangerous
discovery abuses. Though this solution would be a bright line test, and
could be administered effectively, there is also no guarantee that
courts will accept such a limitation. For example, courts generally
have found that "[o]ne waiver consequently waives the privilege as to
all the lawyers working jointly on the matter; there are not numerous
privileges between each of the firm's attorneys and the client." 171 In
light of such precedent, the litigation counsel limitation is not likely to
be accepted by many district courts, and Federal Circuit approval would
be doubtful.
169. See Flagel & Terner, supra note 164, at 20.
170. Id. at 21.
171. Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 n.1 (W.D. Mich.
1991)(citing Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 227 U.S.P.Q. 886, 887 (D. Mass. 1985)).
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B. A Temporal Limit on the Scope of the Waiver
The Micron Separations decision imposed one final limitation on
the discoverability of litigation files in addition to the limitations
discussed above. The alleged infringer needed only to produce
documents disclosed to the client "prior to the date on which the
instant action was filed. ' 172 Unfortunately, the court failed to explain
the rationale for imposing this limitation. The Micron Separations
court is not alone in applying this temporal limitation, nor in its lack of
reasoning to support it. Four years earlier, the court in Kelsey Hayes
Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp. also crafted a temporal limitation in a scope
of the waiver situation. That court held "the order to produce is
limited to opinions and materials prepared prior to the date Plaintiff
filed this action." 173
Finally, and most recently, the court in Electro Scientific
Industries v. General Scanning, Inc.174 applied a temporal limitation
on the scope of the waiver. Following discussion of the need to waive
work product protection of documents which were not communicated
to the client, the court announced its order:
My order, however, will only reach documents that were prepared
before the lawsuit was filed and that relate to the analyses of
infringement, validity, and/or enforceability--so documents with
more direct tactical sensitivity, like outlines of possible questions for
deponents or trial witnesses, or compilations of materials to be used
to support an argument to the jury, would remain off limits. 175
Magistrate Judge Brazil explained the reasons behind the temporal
limitation, stating:
There is a greater risk that the kind of order I am entering here will
cause harm to the interests in creativity and candor that are
advanced when lawyers believe that their analyses and conclusions
will remain private. Again, however, it is important to bear in mind
that this order will result in disclosure of no work product materials
that were generated after the lawsuit was filed. 176
Though some harm would be done to the interests which underlie
work product protection, those interests would be preserved by
limiting the scope of waiver to work product created prior to the time
172. Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 366 (D. Mass.
1995)(emphasis added).
173. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 155 F.R.D. at 172.
174. 1997 WL 587000, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997).
175. Id.
176. Id. at *9.
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the case was filed.177
The court's use of the commencement of litigation as the end-
date for the waiver of the privilege and work product protections
makes a great deal of sense as a limitation on the scope of the waiver
in addition to the limitations previously discussed. First, the state of
mind of the alleged infringer is the key to the willfulness inquiry. The
patentee will gain access to documents produced and relied upon by
opinion counsel which may have influenced the accused infringer's
state of mind. The patentee will also be able to discover information
provided to the client prior to the initiation of litigation which may
have influenced the accused infringer's state of mind. Further, the
alleged infringer typically has actual notice of a pending patent
dispute, as discussed above. 178 In the absence of such notice, the
prejudicial inferences which may be drawn in the absence of the
advice of counsel cannot be drawn. The purity of an alleged infringer's
intent is best judged before the filing of litigation. The temporal
limitation thus makes sense 'as an evidentiary principle.
Such a rule is practical to apply, and fair in result. A bright line
limitation set at the time of filing recognizes that "documents which
relate directly to preparation for trial of a case likely have no bearing
on the issues." 179 General discussion of trial strategy, determinations
of which defenses to utilize and which to de-emphasize, and so on,
may seem to "cast doubt" on a preexisting patent opinion. As
explained above, such evidence does not truly bear on the state of
mind of the accused infringer in most cases. The accused infringer has
decided that it has enough of a case to attempt a good-faith defense in
federal court. At most, this additional evidence may be used by a
patentee to learn about an alleged infringer's trial strategy, and what
the accused infringer believes to be the strongest and weakest parts of
their arguments. If the alleged infringer does not have a good faith
argument, but decides to press the advice of counsel defense anyway,
sanctions exist to punish the infringer's conduct.1 80 Typical trial
strategy documents and discussions will shed no additional light on the
situation; evidence of bad faith may be obtained elsewhere, and a
frivolous claim is punishable regardless of whether the alleged
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
179. Clintec Nutrition Co. v. Baxa Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4001, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
March 28, 1996).
180. For example, FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
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infringer actually thought the claim was frivolous. 181
An alleged infringer can, through the use of an action for
declaratory relief, choose the time of filing. The potential for an
alleged infringer to abuse a temporal limitation of the scope of the
waiver by filing a declaratory judgment in order to preserve its
discovery protections is virtually nonexistent. First, as explained
above, the Federal Circuit places tremendous weight on patent
opinions sought and issued prior to commencement of litigation.
182
Filing of a good faith declaratory judgment action could allow a
possible infringer the luxury of discovery protection while avoiding
the traditional risks associated with the failure to obtain a patent
opinion upon a notice of alleged infringement (i.e., the "contrary
inference" of Underwater Devices).183 But a potential infringer is
unlikely to file a claim prior to receiving notice from the patentee. The
action would be subject to Rule 11, making it important for the
potential infringer to have some good-faith basis for its claim. Failure
to obtain a patent opinion prior to filing a declaratory relief action
could result in the Underwater Devices inference. Finally, the
uncertainty of success in litigation coupled with the uncertainty of
whether a patent is valid and, if so, whether the party has infringed it
would place substantial pressure on the vast majority of declaratory
judgment plaintiffs to at least obtain the advice of counsel in a patent
opinion prior to filing. Effective application of Rule 11 and other
sanctions would prevent abuse by the small minority who ignore the
economic pressures created by the resulting uncertainty.
Use of the time of filing limitation may not make a court's inquiry
concerning documents which contradict or cast doubts on prior patent
opinions easier, but nor will it hinder the court. It will, however,
protect trial counsel's documents relating to trial strategy. Such post-
filing communications deserve protection in order to allow litigation
counsel to provide meaningful advice to an accused infringer. The
uncertainty created by the Micron Separations "casts doubt" test to set
the scope of the waiver is justifiable prior to the filing of a patent
181. Id.
182. See supra Part I.B.2. Though the Federal Circuit has found that a showing that the
alleged infringer maintained a good faith reliance on the advice of counsel will be an
adequate substitute for a patent opinion, this is typical limited to the context where the
actual filing of the case was the only actual notice of potential patent infringement. See
Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 511 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
183. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
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action. Indeed, concerns regarding fairness, and the potential for an
alleged infringer to abuse the discovery process by invoking the advice
of counsel defense, make that test extremely important. After a patent
case is filed, however, litigation counsel should provide an accused
infringer with .the best possible advice, and should not be chilled by
the potential for a broad discovery order down the road. A bright line
limitation at the time of filing will achieve this result, allowing an
alleged infringer to continue to control litigation by obtaining the




The scope of the waiver of discovery protections in patent cases
involving the advice of counsel defense remains extremely vague. The
ability of litigators to provide meaningful advice to their clients could
be severely hindered should the trend towards a broad view of the
scope of the waiver continue. The client's ability to monitor litigation
strategy, as well as to make an informed decision regarding whether or
not a case should go forward, is in jeopardy. Trial courts can draw
several lines to help clarify the scope of the waiver. A line between
opinion and litigation counsel is one such limitation. A line set firmly
at the filing date of a patent matter, in the absence of abuse by the
accused infringer, would serve both to protect the first principles of
the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines. This
limitation would also protect the ability of a patentee to challenge the
advice of counsel defense. Without such a line, however, the potential
for discovery abuse by patentees may present as significant a danger
as the abuses of alleged infringers might be were there no waiver of
discovery protection at all.
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